The European Union considers conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of its foreign policy. It makes use of a number of policy instruments to promote conflict transformation through 'constructive engagement', which cover a range of sectors affecting conditions and incentives at the micro level. The EU has recognised the importance of engaging with civil society in situations of violent conflict, but needs to engage more with local civil society to make its policies more effective. This paper provides a conceptual framework and discussion to analyse which local civil society actors play a role in conflict and conflict transformation, through which activities they impact on conflicts and how, what determines their effectiveness, and finally how EU neighbourhood policies can enhance their constructive impact in peacefully transforming conflicts in its near abroad by engaging with civil society.
Introduction
The European Union, historically conceived as a peace project, has considered conflict resolution as a cardinal objective of its fledging foreign policy. The Lisbon Treaty explicitly states that the EU aims to promote peace (Title I, Article 3-1) and that its role in the world would reflect the principles that have inspired its creation, development and enlargement (Title V, Article 21). The Treaty identifies the contribution to peace, the prevention of conflict and the strengthening of international security amongst its core foreign policy priorities (Title V, Article 2c). More interestingly, the EU's conception of peace has been broad, long-term and organic, including the principles of democracy, human rights, rule of law, international law, good governance and economic development (Commission 2001) . The promotion of structural and sustainable peace has been prioritized above all in the EU neighbourhood. This was made clear in the 2003 Security Strategy, which argues that the Union's task is to 'make a particular contribution to stability and good governance in our immediate neighbourhood (and) to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the EU and on the borders of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy cooperative relations ' (European Council 2003) . It was reiterated in the Lisbon Treaty which posits that the Union 'shall develop a special relationship with neighbouring countries, aiming to establish an area of prosperity and good neighbourliness, founded on the values of the Union' (Title I, Article 8). Most poignantly, the documents establishing the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) voice the Union's aspiration to contribute to the solution of regional conflicts (Commission 2004, p. 6) .
These public pronouncements clearly suggest that the EU is intent in promoting conflict transformation and resolution, over and above conflict management and settlement in the neighbourhood. In other words, the EU is not simply interested in pursuing the management of conflicts through negotiation and compromise, incentivized by external powers deploying conditional sticks and carrots. It rejects the idea that violent conflict is endemic to human nature and espouses the view that conflict resolution is possible through the search for mutually beneficial solutions that allow for the satisfaction of all parties' basic human needs (Burton 1990) . Further still, the EU views as critical "indicators" of conflict prevention and resolution issues such as human and minority rights, democracy, state legitimacy, dispute resolving mechanisms, rule of law, social solidarity, sustainable development and a flourishing civil society (Kronenberger and Wouters 2005) . This suggests that the Union aims at transforming the structural features of violent conflict, eradicating what Galtung (1969, 1994) defines as the seeds of structural violence: social injustice, unequal development and discrimination. While theoretically distinct, the EU's approach also fits what Richmond (2006) conceptually and more broadly defines as third-generation "peace-building approaches", which cover the wider economic, political and social make-up of countries both before, during and after the end of violent conflict.
Beyond foreign policy objectives, the EU is also endowed with policy instruments to pursue conflict resolution and transformation in the neighbourhood. Beyond the narrow sphere of European Security and Defence Policy and the peace-keeping and peace-building missions that it foresees, the Union promotes conflict transformation principally through its "constructive engagement" with conflict parties (Commission 2001, p. 8-9) . By constructive engagement EU actors mean the deployment of a rich variety of measures of cooperation, which are normally specified in contractual agreements with third countries. These contractual relations take different forms, foreseeing different degrees of integration into and cooperation with the EU. They range from the accession process aimed at the full membership of a candidate country, to looser forms of association, which envisage measures of economic, political and social cooperation with EU structures. As in the case of the accession process, these looser forms of association are also "contractual" in nature. Rather than a Treaty of Accession they foresee Association Agreements for the southern Mediterranean countries, Partnership and Cooperation Agreements for the former Soviet countries, Stabilization and Association Agreements for the Western Balkan countries and the future Neighbourhood Agreements (or Enhanced Agreements) for the southern and eastern neighbours. Beyond the goal of achieving varying degrees of cooperation with the EU, these contractual ties aim at fostering long-run structural change, such as conflict transformation, within and between third countries.
Within the tradition of conflict transformation, the role of civil society is of the essence (Lederach 1997 , Rupesinghe 1995 . Civil society organizations (CSOs) on the one hand are pivotal in providing the necessary support for peace, ensuring that any agreement negotiated by political leaders is ultimately accepted and implemented on the ground (Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1999) . On the other hand, civil society can provide the necessary push for peaceful social change, especially when the top echelons within a conflict context are unwilling or unable to budge on the fundamental conflict issues. This is not to say that civil society is always and necessarily a force for good. In so far as civil society is a reflection of society at large, in contexts of violent conflict and divided societies "uncivil society" inevitably exists and at times thrives. It can contribute to the polarization within and between communities, the reinforcement of horizontal inequalities and the legitimization or actual use of violence in the name of nationalism, exclusionary ideologies and at times even democracy, human rights and self-determination (Barnes 2005) . In other words, civil society is both an agent for change and a reflection of the conflict structure. By operating within a structure of conflict, often marked by state failure, authoritarianism, poverty and insecurity, civil society can be an actor in conflict escalation, inciting nationalism, ethnocentrism and violence (Paffenholz and Spurk 2006 ). Yet even in these cases, civil society remains a force to be reckoned with if the EU is intent in transforming conflicts in its troubled neighbourhood.
The EU has already acknowledged the importance of engaging with civil society in order to enhance the effectiveness of its foreign policy in general and conflict resolution policy in particular. To this end, since the late 1990s, the European Yet a critical value added in the search for more effective EU policies lies in greater engagement with local civil society in conflict contexts in the neighbourhood. These CSOs may often look rather different from European organizations working on conflict, and may well be non-voluntary in nature, less organized, less professional and with fewer human and financial resources than their EU counterparts. Yet whether formally organized or informal associations or non-voluntary groupings, local civil society typically has a greater understanding, legitimacy and stake in both conflict and conflict transformation (Bell and Carens 2004) . Rather than acting as an external bystander, it is a first hand actor in conflict, and as such represents a necessary, albeit not sufficient, actor in promoting peace. As part of society, local civil society can recognize and understand the underlying root causes of greed and grievance underpinning conflict , the failure of the social contract to peacefully regulate social needs and desires, and consequently the polarization and tension between communities (see Microcon 2008) . At the same time, local CSOs can act as the seed of group formation, mobilization, communication and empowerment, which are necessary to induce peaceful social change (Varshney 2001) , but which may also create the necessary "opportunity" for conflict escalation (Microcon 2008) .
The EU itself is beginning to recognize the need to engage more with local civil society actors (Commission 2006b). As put by the former UN Secretary General (2004) : '[i]f peacebuilding missions are to be effective, they should, as part of a clear political strategy, work with and strengthen those civil society forces that are helping ordinary people to voice their concerns, and to act on them in peaceful ways … Engagement with civil society is not an end in itself, nor is it a panacea. But it is vital to our efforts to turn the promise of peace agreements into the reality of peaceful societies and viable states'. In other words, engaging with local civil society is of the essence to enhance the legitimacy, rootedness and thus long-term effectiveness of EU conflict transformation policies in its neighbourhood.
With this premise in mind, the aim of this paper is to provide a conceptual framework and discussion to analyse which local civil society actors play a role in conflict and conflict transformation, through which activities they impact on conflicts and how, what determines their effectiveness, and finally how can EU neighbourhood policies enhance their constructive impact in peacefully transforming conflicts in its near abroad by engaging with civil society.
Civil Society in Conflict and Conflict Transformation
Civil society can be broadly defined as the area of voluntary collective action, driven by shared values and/or interests which operates beyond the state, the market and the family, and which provides the web of social relations linking these three spheres (Barnes 2005 , Paffenholz and Spurk 2006 , Fischer 2006 . In view of its tight interconnection with the conflict structure, local civil society at times promotes the civic values and practices necessary for a peaceful transformation of conflict, while at other times directly contributes to the causes and symptoms of conflict. As such civil society is not understood here as a normative concept but rather as an analytical category of actors to be investigated in order to ascertain what their precise impact on conflict is.
A typology of actors
Who constitutes local civil society in conflict contexts? In view of the broad and analytical definition given of civil society, we include a wide variety of actors in our study. Table 1 adapts the categorization provided by Diamond and McDonald's (1996) multi-track diplomacy model to distinguish between eight different types of actors, which can be engaged directly or indirectly in conflict and conflict transformation: conflict professionals, economic actors, private citizens, training and education bodies, activists, religion-based actors, funding bodies, and communication actors. Although there is inevitably some overlap in the membership and roles of these different categories, these eight groupings are sufficiently delineated to allow for a precise identification of the different CSOs involved in conflict (Marchetti and Tocci 2007) . 
Local civil society potential for conflict escalation and transformation
Precisely how and why does local civil society contribute to conflict escalation as well as transformation? As noted above, civil society, while being distinct from the state, the family and the market, acts as the social glue between the three, thus undertaking an essentially political function in society. In other words, civil society is distinct from, while interacting with, politics and policy across all its domains (Chazan 1992, p.281) . As analysed by Lederarch (1997) and reproduced in Figure 1 , civil society is active at both mid-and grassroots-levels of society. At mid-level there are elite civil society actors ranging from universities and research centres, professional NGOs, unions and professional associations, local media groups, artists, as well as overtly "uncivil society" groups such as organized crime networks. At grassroots level we find CSOs and networks such as community, women, student and faith-based groups, social movements and activists, combatant groups and supporting institutions, cooperatives, self-help organizations and charities.
Most important, civil society links the three stylized levels of society in Lederarch's pyramid. On the one hand, mid-level CSOs are closely tied to top-level policy-making through their interactions with parliaments, executives, big business, foundations and major media holdings. Through their advocacy, policy research, and negotiation support activities, mid-level CSOs can both ease conflict settlement and press top echelons to modify the structural features of governance that gave rise to conflict in the first place. These mid-level actors build personal and professional relations with the top echelons and provide a pivotal function because of their unofficial nature.
Compared to the top level, mid-level CSOs in fact normally enjoy more political independence, and thus more creativity and flexibility, as well as greater ability to operate beyond the limelight of the media. This allows these actors to act as critical norm entrepreneurs in conflict transformation (Wallace and Josselin 2001) . They also have better access to and dialogue with diverse sectors of society, being able to talk to different parties without losing credibility; and a greater inclination to work on longterm and structural issues rather than on the short-term ones determined by the current political agenda. Indeed as noted by , many NGOs emerged in the 1990s precisely as a response to the peacebuilding requirements of states and international organizations.
On the other hand, mid-level actors are organically linked to grassroots CSOs, which are principal agents in the cultivation of "peace constituencies" in society writ large (Lederarch 1997). They do so by mobilizing the public to tackle and react to the underlying conditions of structural or open violence through education, training, capacity-building and awareness raising. Indeed many social movements are constituted by networks of like-minded NGOs operating at grassroots and mid-levels.
Mid and grassroots CSOs also induce conflict transformation by fostering societal reconciliation, through inter-communal dialogue, peace commissions and by fostering functional cooperation and communication across communities. Finally, local CSOs can reach out to the wider public through service delivery, be this of a material (e.g., relief and rehabilitation) or psychological nature (post-war trauma therapy). Local civil society interactions with the public are of the essence to ensure that the voice of the people is not swamped in the evolution of both conflict and peace.
Figure 1: The Conflict Transformation Potential of Civil Society
Source: Lederarch (1997) Yet precisely because of the linkages it provides across different levels of society, local civil society can also act as a factor in conflict escalation. As noted above, local civil society is an agent in conflict as well as a product of the conflict structure. As a microcosm of society, it inevitably displays the underlying causes and symptoms of conflict. In situations of violent conflict, local civil society actors can provide the rationale and moral justification for violence, partake and support violent actions, or contribute through discourse to the overall securitization of the conflict. In conflicts marked by ethnic or religious strife, civil society can promote ideologies based on racism, nationalism and intolerance, thus exacerbating communal divisions, enemy images and exclusive identities. In conflicts marked by socio-economic inequalities and political discrimination, civil society can reinforce the conditions of structural
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State bodies, parties, big business, media holdings violence and power asymmetry, divert resources away from productive activities, and dis-empower underprivileged communities.
Civil Society Activities
Beyond their role and linkage function in society, through which activities can local civil society contribute to conflict escalation and transformation? Do these actions impact directly or indirectly on the conflict? How can these activities be categorized?
And do some civil society actions prevail at different stages of conflict and conflict transformation?
Direct and indirect civil society actions in conflict
The activities of local CSOs can be directly or indirectly linked to the conflict situation. Direct activities are those whose objective is to contribute explicitly to the conflict and its transformation. These actions can be directly aimed at conflict escalation. Combatant groups can mobilize for violent rebellion, research centres or religious leaders can provide the intellectual or moral justification for violence, discrimination or repression; universities and the media can foster enemy images and a securitized understanding of the conflict; and professional associations and unions can support and exacerbate ethnic or religious discrimination. On the opposite end of the spectrum local CSOs can be involved in peaceful conflict transformation. Social movements, student and women groups can mobilize for non-violent social change;
NGOs can foster inter-communal dialogue, provide support to official negotiations, and engage in truth and reconciliation activities; universities, research centres and activists can monitor and denounce public policies and practices on the ground; training NGOs, artists and youth groups can engage in peace education and the rearticulation of identities, interests and values within conflict societies. Last, local civil society can have a direct role in conflict transformation by operating on the symptoms of conflict. Hence charities, community-based groups and social welfare organizations can provide relief to affected populations; and professional NGOs can be engaged in trauma therapy, de-mining and reconstruction efforts.
Local CSOs can also be indirectly involved in conflict and conflict transformation by working on issues which are tied to the conflict. Hence, local CSOs can engage in activities pertaining to issues such as democracy, human rights, governance, security sector reform, justice, gender, education or development, i.e., all issues which are inextricably tied to the eruption, evolution and transformation of conflict. On the negative side, organized crime networks can indirectly sustain conflict by thriving on war economies and thus pressing for the continuation of conflict.
Methods of actions across stages of conflict
Local civil society activities can be divided broadly according to their general method and approach: they can be adversarial or non-adversarial; they can deal with the causes or with the symptoms of conflict. As in the case of CSO actors, this categorization of activities is not exclusive and there are significant areas of overlap.
However defining activities according to these four broad methods of action can help organize and better understand a broad range of activities.
Adversarial actions can be roughly divided between largely grassroots actions aimed at public mobilization, and mid-level actions aimed at top-level advocacy, monitoring and shaming. In both cases adversarial methods aim at transforming conflict by altering power relations and cost-benefit calculations within a conflict context. They aim at increasing the political, social, legal or economic costs for conflict parties persisting in a particular position or action. Hence on the one hand, social movements, activists, trade unions, and women, student and youth groups can raise public awareness of conflict issues and mobilize the people into adversarial collective action through demonstrations, strikes, campaigns and petitions. Artists and journalists can powerfully expose and sensitize the public to the causes and symptoms of conflict, as well as the underlying conditions of structural violence. On the other hand, particularly mid-level CSOs can engage in advocacy and denunciation vis-à-vis toplevel echelons as well as the international community, basing their activities on factfinding, early-warning and monitoring. Mid-level professional NGOs and bar associations can also engage in litigation with public authorities, in order to expose and seek rectification to injustices through legal action.
By contrast, non-adversarial activities can also be divided between dialogue and research activities, and are normally carried out by mid-level actors. Both types of activities are non-adversarial in the sense that they rely on non-coercive methods or persuasion and learning in order to induce social change in conflict. Dialogue activities can take different forms (Rothman 1998) . Tracks 2 and 3 diplomacy activities are aimed at supporting official negotiations and working through differences between conflict parties. They include inter-communal dialogue projects between people sharing similar professional roles and experiences (e.g., unionists, students, women, religious leaders) in order to foster cross-communal trust and understanding, and subsequent changes in the perceptions of the "other". They can include exclusively moderates across conflict divides in order to elaborate joint peace proposals in a problem-solving fashion and act as pre-negotiation forums.
Alternatively, they can engage extremists as well in order to allow all parties to voice their concerns, establish human contact and hedge against potential spoiling activities without necessarily seeking consensus between participants (Ropers 2003) . Beyond dialogue, non-adversarial activities also include policy research and advocacy, aimed at identifying gaps in the analysis of conflict or proposing solutions for resolution to the top-echelons in order to sustain and complement official peace processes. de-mining, refugee repatriation, education and training, and truth and reconciliation activities. As discussed by Bell and Keenan (2004) , in situations of conflict transition, some civil society actors focussing on particular functions may no longer be needed while others may have to revise their philosophies, mandates and modus operandi. Naturally establishing the precise impact of a civil society is no simple feat. As discussed by Anderson and Olson (2003) problems of impact assessment are of three different kinds. First, the causal relation between a particular CSO activity and an ensuing impact on the conflict may be extremely difficult to disentangle. Second, civil society impact is often unmeasurable, in so far as it relates to a gradual and highly complex shift in beliefs, visions, interests, identities and relationships. Third, while we may be able to determine the precise impact of one activity, the relationship of this micro impact to the macro developments within a conflict are subjective and difficult to ascertain. In other words, impact analysis is often qualitative in nature and in part subjective. Yet it can nonetheless prove to be a highly fruitful exercise to be carefully conducted through interviews with CSOs, the recipients of their activities as well as through cross-checking interviews with other official and civil society actors acquainted with the specific activity under investigation.
Effectiveness
Beyond impact, a last key variable in the analysis of local civil society in conflict is its A third determinant of effectiveness is the relationship between the CSO and state institutions and the mainstream media. Here the most evident point to make is that CSOs which are close to or accepted by the state tend to be the ones espousing Finally, the effectiveness of local CSOs depends on country-specific and timecontingent factors. The scope for effective CSO action depends on the extent to which the laws, institutions and political culture of a specific conflict country allow for and accept a "political" role of local civil society in conflict. Dominant political ideologies within a country also determine which CSOs may prove more influential and effective. In situations rampant nationalism for example, one could expect nationalistic CSOs to have greater resonance, support and influence than technical NGOs promoting multicultural or civic values. Specific events or trends in a country also have in some instances favoured the growth, development and effectiveness of civil society while on other occasions curtailed the scope foe CSO activity.
The Role of the EU in the Neighbourhood
Particularly if the EU is intent in promoting conflict transformation, over and above conflict management and settlement, then it cannot afford to neglect the civil society dimension in conflict. As noted at the outset, the EU is prone to viewing and intervening in conflicts in a bottom-up and structural manner, and many of its policy instruments can influence the conditions and incentives playing out at the mid or micro levels of conflict. This is true particularly of the EU's interactions with neighbouring countries. In particular the ENP, building upon existing contractual ties with neighbouring countries (e.g., the Association Agreements with the southern should it engage, ignore or weaken these CSOs, and only interact with peacebuilding ones? What should its approach be towards holding activities? Should it only focus on peacebuilding CSOs or also engage with holding ones in order to ensure that their activities would in the long-term cultivate the terrain for peace? Second, does the ENP succeed in raising the effectiveness of CSO peacebuilding activities, or does it instead, inadvertently, weaken the impact of these activities? How could the ENP raise the effectiveness of civil society peacebuilding actions? In order to answer these two fundamental policy questions we set out three hypotheses to guide ensuing empirical research into five conflicts in the neighbourhood. These three hypotheses are by no means mutually exclusive, and we may well find that features of all three co-exist within the same conflict in the EU neighbourhood.
Hypothesis 1: The Liberal Peace Paradigm
A first hypothesis to be tested is that the EU contributes to conflict transformation by:
a. strengthening the structure of local civil society by raising the interconnectedness between mid-level CSOs and top-level actors on the one hand, and mid-level and grassroots actors on the other, thus raising the effectiveness of civil society impact on conflict b. enhancing the agency of peacebuilding CSOs, while weakening or constructively altering the views and actions of fuelling/holding CSOs. The EU would do so primarily by engaging directly with mid-level CSOs (through dialogue and funding) and by indirectly reaching out to grassroots CSOs.
In meeting this hypothesis, the EU fulfils two principal aims. A minimum threshold objective is that of "doing no harm" (Anderson 1999) . The EU thus ensures that its policies, be these aimed at structure or agency, do not have negative distortionary effects, such as delegitimizing peacebuilding CSOs through excessive co-option; or inadvertedly strengthening fuelling CSOs by openly supporting, ignoring or actively attempting to weaken them. A maximum threshold objective is that of building local capacities for peace by empowering peacebuilding CSOs and weakening or altering the views of fuelling ones (Bigdon and Korf 2002) . As illustrated by Figure 2 , the EU would increase the interconnectedness of the three levels of society (point a. above), and on the other raise its effectiveness in conflict transformation by interacting with mid-level CSOs, which are in turn connected to grassroots CSOs and the wider public (point b. above). Under a second hypothesis, EU engagement with local civil society is detrimental to
Hypothesis 2: The Leftist Critique
Under a second hypothesis, EU engagement with local civil society is detrimental to conflict transformation. This is not simply because the EU misidentifies local CSOs thus inadvertently strengthening fuelling CSOs and/or weakening peacebuilding ones.
It is rather because the very fact of engaging with local civil society alters its nature and effectiveness in a manner detrimental to peace.
This could take place in two interlinked ways. First, EU interaction and engagement with local CSOs could lead to a seeming "depoliticization" of local civil society (Fischer 1997) , rendering mid-level CSOs technical instruments at the service of top-
Grassroots
Community-based groups, youth, social movements, women groups, activists, faith based groups, charities, service-based organizations (Belloni 2001) . EU (and other external) funding and support for civil society in conflict may in fact lead to an "explosion" of the NGO sector, also dubbed "non-grassroots organizations", briefcase NGOs (BRINGOs), mafia NGOs (MANGOs), criminal NGOs (CRINGOs), government-owned NGOs (GONGOs), commercial NGOs (CONGOs) and my-own NGOs (MONGOs) (Reimann 2005, p.42) . Driven by external funds, these organizations become veritable businesses, and may also enhance corruption in the civil society domain, inequalities and even creating new stakes in the continuation of conflict. Smaller or more political organizations would either be directly shunned by the EU or they would fail to meet the necessary technical/bureaucratic requirements to be allocated EU funds. As such, the potential for the constructive mobilization and politicization of society would reduce, diminishing the prospects for grassroots actors to alter the structural conditions of violent conflict.
Mid-range
Second, EU and more generally external engagement with and support for civil society could excessively "politicize" and co-opt civil society, transforming local CSOs into spokesmen of external policies, priorities and proposed solutions, which may be alien to the needs and desires of the conflict parties themselves (see Ferguson 1990 and Chandler 1998) . As put by Richmond (2005, p. 26) , CSOs would act 'as thinly veiled fronts for powerful state interests in that they act as a front for the insertion of realist state interests in a disguised form'. Civil society would thus become driven more by the top-down supply of external funds than a bottom-up demand of societal needs and desires. In an attempt to justify or legitimize EU policies in conflict contexts, civil society actors would delegitimize themselves, to the point of being viewed as "traitors" in the eyes of grassroots CSOs and the wider public. The mere fact of being funded by an external actor such as the EU could also create the perception in the public's mind that a CSO acts on behalf of foreign rather than domestic interests.
In other words, under this second hypothesis, EU policies in conflict contexts would not be strengthened by engagement with local civil society, aimed at improving the rootedness and the transformative potential of the EU. The reverse would instead take place, whereby the EU would fundamentally shape and alter the nature of local civil society into a dependent functional substitute within the liberal paradigm of EU foreign policy, detaching and delegitimizing it in the eyes of the public (see also Chandler 2001) . In doing so a limited and distorted form of civil society would emerge while existing local capacity would be harmed or destroyed (Richmond and Carey 2005) . Civil society would lose its autonomy and become accountable to EU donors rather than its own domestic constituencies. It would respond to the EU's political priorities as well as the tendency to focus on short-term, outcome-driven and quantifiable projects, which may be far removed from the long-term, dynamic, process-driven and multidimensional needs of peacebuilding (Vukosavljevic 2007) .
As a result local civil society involved in peacebuilding would become ineffective at best or switch into holding or fuelling conflict at worst. As highlighted in Figure 3 policies. This is highlighted in Figure 4 , which shows a detachment of the top levels of society from mid and grassroots actors. In this context, EU policy would ineffectively influence conflicts by engaging with CSOs yet failing to pressurize the top-levels to engage in structural change. 

Guidelines for Empirical Research
Mid-range
Local government, local media, domestic and international NGOs, professional associations, unions, intellectuals
Grassroots
Community-based groups, youth, women groups, social movements, activists, faith based groups, charities, service-based organizations
Top-level
State institutions, parties, big business, foundations
The aim of this paper has been to provide a conceptual analysis and framework to understand the role and impact the EU may have on conflict and conflict transformation by interacting with local civil society in conflict contexts. Its purpose is to guide future empirical research into the EU's role, through civil society, in five conflicts in the neighbourhood: Georgia and Abkhazia, Moldova and Transnistria, delve into the processes that drive EU actions in conflict contexts through civil society.
